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Abstract
In this paper it has been studied the safety of a widespread class of microcomputer systems for real
time control, systems with active redundancy (hot standby), composed of two identical units with
three modes of each unit – active, safely failed and dangerously failed states. Markov modelling has
been used. Safety is estimated by the dangerous failure function and MTBDF. The aim of the study is
to prove that the system’s reliability is significantly greater than that of the separate unit while safety
does not change sufficiently, which makes the system applicable as a signalling one.
Keywords: reliability, safety, microcomputer signalling systems, hot standby.
1. Introduction
The subject of this investigation is the fault tolerance hot standby microcomputer
signalling system. The scheme of such system is shown in Fig. 1.
Both units B (basic) and R (reserve) consist of information-processing de-
vices (microcomputers, controllers or hard logic’s electronic circuits) with built-in
self-control instruments C, which control their failures. If a failure occurs in any
unit, an incorrect signal could appear on its outputs which could have unregulated
and even dangerous consequences. Therefore after the failure has been discovered,
the self-control instruments C act upon a switch Sw, which commutes the unit’s
outputs.
In due time (for a time shorter than the interval tDIN of the PR information
uncertainty allowed by the process) PR cannot accept the applied control signals.
This is a time parameter, which characterizes the inertia of the controlled important
technological process (ITP).
Normally, both units accept simultaneously the initial information I from the
operator and the control information from PR and they are in an equal information
state. If a failure is discovered in the unit B, Sw1 switches the control of ITP to
unit R, which underrates it. If the failure is in unit R, Sw2 switches the process off,
protecting it from an incorrect and possibly dangerous control.
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The so defined subject of investigation is a fault tolerant hot standby system.
Such systems have been discussed in the literature: HENLEY et al. (1981),
KANTZ et al. (1995), GUPTA et al. (1993A), GUPTA et al. (1993B), LIEYU et
al. (1992), KRIS et al. (1993), CAO et al. (1989), ZHOU et al (1991). Standby
techniques are used to improve system reliability. Here we prove that the system’s
reliability compared to the separate unit’s reliability is significantly greater while
safety does not change sufficiently which makes these systems applicable as sig-
nalling ones. Such systems are used to ITP, which ruin of parameters may lead
to a danger for people’s life and health or loss of huge material, cultural or natural
values.
Fig. 1. Scheme of Hot Standby Microcomputer Signalling System
As a method for solving the tasks, pointed above, the theory of Markov’s ran-
dom processes is used: CHRISTOV (1990), CHRISTOV and STOYTCHEVA (1992),
SAPOJNIKOV et al. (1995), CHRISTOV and STOYTCHEVA (1995), LAPRIE and
MEDHAFFER-KANOUN (1982), QUIRRK (1988), HENLEY and KUMAMOTO
(1981), AVIZIENIS et al. (1991), DALE and FOSTER (1987).
2. Description of the Model
The aspect in which the hot standby microcomputer system is investigated is the
reliability and safety of the system.
Reliability will be measured by two characteristics (CHRISTOV (1990), SA-
POJNIKOV et al. (1995), LAPRIE and MEDHAFFER-KANOUN (1982), HENLEY
and KUMAMOTO (1981), AVIZIENIS et al. (1991)):
• Function of Availability A(t). It can be proven that for the values of the λ and
the µ, that are of practical interest (see Section 4), the availability function
A(t) quickly reaches a constant limited probability, known as the availability
coefficient KA = limt→∞ A(t) after which the availability is not changed.
• Mathematical Expectation of Time between Consequent Failures (the mean
time between failures) MTBF, which is the reciprocal value of the failure fre-
quency H. It shows the failures’ number per unit time. It is well known, for
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example, from KOCHS (1984), that H = Kλ. It is known from reliability the-
ory, but in KOCHS (1984) it has common means, available for homogeneous
Markov’s random processes.
Safety in this paper is investigated in the aspect of the system behaviour after
failure, e.g. CHRISTOV (1990), CHRISTOV and STOYTCHEVA (1992), LAPRIE
and MEDHAFFER-KANOUN (1982). This technogene safety is regarded as a single
feature of reliability. While reliability is determined by any failure of activity, safety
is a result only of the dangerous failures. Dangerous is the failure, which has not
been discovered from the system by adopted means of control for time tDIN.
The units B and R as well as the system as a whole can have three states
(Fig. 2):
1. – active (A), when correct controlling signals are formed towards the process.
2. – dangerously failed (D), when the failure remains undiscovered for a time
greater than the information uncertainty time allowed by the process. In
this case the incorrect controlling signals can have unpredictable, including
dangerous consequences.
3. – safely failed (S), when incorrect output signal is formed, but within the
information uncertainty time tDIN allowed by the process, the failure is dis-
covered and the switch Sw turns the incorrect signals off.
Fig. 2. States of the units B and R
The transitions between the states are determined by the intensities λ, µD and
µS , as well as by the probability p for the failure to be discovered in due time.
Safety in the aspect studied is estimated by the following characteristics:
• Function of the system failure on the dangerous side D(t), which measures
the change of the probability the system to be found in dangerously failed
state during mission time t . For this parameter is also true what has been said
above about availability. In long enough time it reaches a constant value,
known as the dangerous coefficient KD.
• mean time between the successive dangerous failures MTBDF. This is the
time between two successive appearances of a dangerously failed state. It is
found as a reciprocal value of the dangerous failure frequency HD:
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HD = K A(1 − p)λ. (1.a)
MTBF (the reliability parameter) for Fig. 2 is:
MTBF = 1
KSµS
. (1.b)
Criterion of a dangerous state D is the presence of a failure, undiscovered for
some time after its appearance, as a result of which the ITP is reached and accepts
incorrect control signals.
Criterion of a safe state S is the presence of a failure, discovered within time
tDI N and a transition towards system’s recovery.
3. Notation
The following assumptions have been made:
1. The failure and restoration flows of both units are Poisson’s.
2. The intensities of the transitions between states S → D (3 → 2) and D → A
(2 → 1) are negligibly small and are not regarded.
3. The commutation mechanism is perfect e.g. failure and error free.
λ – failure rate
µ – restoration rate
p – probability, the unit’s failure to be recognised and discovered dur-
ing the allowed by PR
tDIN – time of information uncertainty
µD – restoration rate of the unit’s operative state following a safely
failed state
µS – restoration rate of the unit’s danger state following a safely failed
state
A(t) – function of availability
D(t) – probability of the system failure on the dangerous side during
mission time
S(t) – safety probability of the system during stays of the system
KAV – availability factor
KN – unavailability factor
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KD – dangerous coefficient (the probability of the system failure on the
dangerous side when time is infinite)
KS – safety coefficient (the safety probability of the system when time
is infinite.)
H – failure frequency
HD – dangerous failure frequency
BA; RA – the basic B (the reserve R) unit is active
BN ; RN – the basic B (the reserve R) unit is inactive
Bi R j – the basic B (the reserve R) units’ states determining the total state
of the system
i, j ⊂ A – normally operating state
S – state failed on safe side
D – state failed on dangerous side.
Partial state of the system is a vector of reliable safe states of the system’s
separate units, in which each unit has one own state.
Pri – probability of a partial state
Ki – limit probabilities of the states
MTBF – Mean Time Between Failure
MTBDF – Mean Time Between Dangerous Failure
4. Model of the Separate Unit’s Reliability and Safety
The reliable safe state of each information-processing unit can be described by the
diagram in Fig. 2, where the states have the meaning given above (Section 2).
At the assumption 1 made above, that the failure and restoration flows are
Poisson’s which is valid for a broad class of systems, the unit’s reliability and
safety characteristics can be found through solving the Kolmogorov differential
equation system, written for the diagram in Fig. 2:
dA(t)
dt
= −[(1 − p)λ+ pλ]A(t) + µS S(t),
dD(t)
dt
= (1 − p)λA(t) − µD D(t), (2)
dS(t)
dt
= pλA(t) + µD D(t)− µS S(t).
Taking a Laplace transform of Eq. (2) and solving them gives:
A(t) = µSµD
r1r2
+ (r1 + µS)(r1 + µD)e
rt1
r1(r1 − r2) −
(r2 + µS)(r2 + µD)ert2
r2(r1 − r2) ,
D(t) =
[
µS
r1r2
+ (r1 + µS)e
rt1
r1(r1 − r2) −
(r2 + µS)ert2
r2(r1 − r2)
]
λ(1 − p)s, (3)
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S(t) =
[
µD
r1r2
+ (r1 · p + µD)e
rt1
r1(r1 − r2) −
(r2 · p + µD)ert2
r2(r1 − r2)
]
λ,
where:
r1,2 = 12
[
− (µS + µD + λ)
±
√
(µS + µD + λ)2 − 4{[µS(1 − p)+ µD]λ+ µSµD}
]
.
For the limit state probabilities (time equals infinity) the following expressions come
out of (3):
KW = µDµS
µDµS + λ[µD + µS(1 − p)] ,
KD = µSλ(1 − p)
µDµS + λ[µD + µS(1 − p)] , (4)
KS = µDλ
µDµS + λ[µD + µS(1 − p)] .
Let us accept some probable values of the parameters participating in these formulas:
λ = 1.10−3 [1/h]; µD = 2 [1/h]; µS = 0.5 [1/h]; p = 0.99.
Substituting in (4) we obtain KA = 0.997999, KD = 4.9 E 10−6 and KS =
0.0019959.
5. Model of the System’s Reliability and Safety
5.1. A Diagram of the System’s Partial States
First a diagram of the system’s partial states is built (Fig. 3). The global states of
the system are three: active, dangerously failed and safety failed.
Second on the base of the system work and the safety criterion (Section 2)
the following connections of the partial states to the global ones are defined:
1. In states 1, 4 and 7 B unit is active and regardless of unit R state, the system
is in an availability state.
2. In state 2 B unit is failed on the safe side and in the process is accordingly
included R unit, which is active. The system is in an availability state.
3. In states 3, 6, 9 B unit is failed on the dangerous side and no transition has
been realised to R unit. The system works dangerously since the failure has
not been discovered in B unit.
4. In state 5 the units are safely failed and the system is accordingly failed on
the safe side.
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Fig. 3. Markov’s diagram of the Hot Standby System
5. In state 8 B unit is safely failed and R unit is dangerously failed. The system
is in a dangerous state as the switching to unit R leads to incorrect output
signals.
The probability of each system’s partial state is obtained as a multiplication
of the probabilities of the unit’s states, which combination it is of.
Pr1 = A(t)B A(t)R , Pr2 = S(t)B A(t)R , Pr3 = D(t)B A(t)R ,
Pr4 = A(t)B S(t)R, Pr5 = S(t)B S(t)R, Pr6 = D(t)B S(t)R,
Pr7 = A(t)B D(t)R, Pr8 = S(t)B D(t)R, Pr9 = D(t)B S(t)R,
(5)
where A(t), S(t) and D(t) are taken from (3).
The limit probabilities of the states on the graph in Fig. 3 are:
K1 = K BAV K RAV , K2 = K RAV K BS , K3 = K RAV K BD,
K4 = K RS K BAV , K5 = K BS K RS , K6 = K BD K RS ,
K7 = K BAV K RD, K8 = K BS K RD, K9 = K BD K RD,
(6)
where K BAV , K BS , K BD , K RAV , K RS and K RD are determined from (4).
The equivalence of the basic and the reserve unit simplifies the investigation
without limiting the generality. Further we are warning at this condition with the
simplified formulas.
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5.2. Reliability
5.2.1. System Availability
To obtain the availability of the system, the probabilities of active partial states have
to be summarised taking into account the units’ identity:
Asys(t) = Pr1 + Pr2 + Pr4 + Pr7 = A(t)[A(t) + 2S(t)+ D(t)]. (7)
Taking into account that A(t) + S(t) + D(t) = 1 and transferring to limit proba-
bilities, which in the worst case limit the readiness, we obtain:
K AV SYS = K AV (1 + KS). (8)
5.2.2. The Mean Time Between Failure MTBFSYS
The mean time between failure of the system MTBFSYS is defined as the inverse
value of the failure frequency of the system incoming the active state:
MTBFSYS = 1HSYS . (9)
Following the transitions in the graph in Fig. 3, we find from theory of KOCHS
(1984):
MTBFSYS = 1K3µD + 2K5µS + K8µS =
1
K AV K DµD + 2K 2SµS + KS K DµS
. (10)
5.3. Safety
5.3.1. Probability of a Dangerous Failure
To obtain the function of the system’s dangerous failure, the probabilities of dan-
gerous partial states have to be summarised taking into account the units’ identity:
DSYS(t) = Pr3 + Pr6 + Pr8 + Pr9 = D(t)[A(t) + 2S(t)+ D(t)]. (11)
Accounting that A(t)+ S(t)+D(t) = 1 and transferring to limit state probabilities,
which in the worst case limit the danger, we obtain:
KD SYS = KD(1 + KS). (12)
From the obtained formulas we can draw the conclusion that due to the hot reserve
(standby) in the system both the readiness and the dangerous work increase.
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5.3.2. MTBDF
Mean Time Between the Dangerous Failures of the system is defined as the recip-
rocal value of the frequency of falling into dangerous state HD SYS.
MTBDFSYS = 1HD SYS . (13)
Following the transitions on the graph in Fig. 3:
HD SYS = K A(K A + KS + KD)(1 − p)λ+ KA KD pλ+ K A KS(1 − p)λ
= K Aλ[(1 − p)(1 + KS)+ KD p]. (14)
We can see that for p = 1, when KD = 0 (see Eq. (4)) , the frequency of falling
into a dangerous state is zero and the time MTBDFSYS tends to infinity.
6. Comparative Analysis of the Reliability and Safety Indexes of the System
and its Comprising Units
In order to estimate qualitatively the effect of introducing the dynamic redundancy
as a second unit in the hot standby regime, we will compare the time parameters,
which determine the MTBF of the system and the time between its successive
dangerous failures with the analogous indexes for its comprising units.
6.1. Comparison by Reliability
To figure out how the system’s lifetime is improved in comparison to the unit’s
lifetime, the following ratio is built:
ξ = MTBFSYS
MTBF
= KsµS
2K AV KDµD + 2K 2SµS + KS KDµD
, (15)
where MTBFSYS is known from (10) and MTBF is known from Eq. (1.b). Substi-
tuting from (4) in (15) and transforming it, we obtain:
ξ = µDµS + λµD + λ(1 − p)µS
µDµS(1 − p)+ 2λµD + λ(1 − p)µS . (16)
It is clear that the prolonging of the expected lifetime of the system depends on all
primary parameters of reliability and safety of the comprising units. For example
the dependence ξ(p) on the probability p to discover the failure on time is linear
and represents a part of a hyperbola, whose lowest point is at p = 0:
ξ = µDµS + λµD + λµS
µDµS + 2λµD + µSλ (17)
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and the highest at p = 1:
ξ = µS + λ
2λ
. (18)
For the accepted above values of the terms included in the formulas (Section 4) it
can be established that for p = 1 ξ = 250. On the other side if p = 0.99 ξ = 72,
i.e. the reliability, measured by the expected lifetime of the system, is orders of
magnitude better than that of the separate unit.
6.2. Comparison by Safety
To understand the influence of the structure on the system’s safety, we can form the
ratio:
η = MTBDFSYS
MTBDF
, (19)
which reveals the change of the system’s safety as compared to the unit’s safety,
measured by this parameter. Using Eqs. (1.a) and (13) and substituting in (19) we
obtain:
η = 1 − p
(1 − p)(1 + KS)+ KD p =
µDµS + λ(1 − p)µS + λµD
µDµS + λµS + 2λµD . (20)
It is obvious that the expected time between the dangerous failures of the system
depends on all primary reliability and safety parameters of the units, that is com-
prised of. For example, the dependence ξ(p) on the probability p to discover the
failure in due time, is linear and decreases from
η = µDµS + λµSλµD
µDµS + λµS + 2λµD at p = 0 (21)
to
η = µD(µS + λ)
µDµS + λµS + 2λµD at p = 1. (22)
As it was shown above in this case both times between the dangerous failures – of
the unit and of the system – tend to infinity and this ratio starts to lose its realistic
meaning.
It was seen, that in the worst case at the practically interesting values of the
terms, participating in the dependence, the ratio η is lowest but very close to 1.
For the adopted above values of the parameters included in the formulas it can be
established that for p = 1 η = 0.997511 and for p = 0.99 η = 0.9979641, i.e. the
mathematical expectation of the time between the dangerous failures of the system
drops only by about 0.2% in comparison to what may be expected for the separate
unit.
HOT STANDBY MICROCOMPUTER SIGNALLING SYSTEMS 27
7. Conclusions
1. The introduction of the second unit as a hot standby (reserve) expresses
exclusively in the increasing of the system’s reliability. The mathematical
expectation of the system lifetime is much greater than that of the separate
unit and depends on its reliable safe parameters p, λ and µ. The effect of the
reserve is as stronger as higher is the discovery of the failure p.
2. The increasing of the discovery of the failures p leads to the decreasing of the
dangerous work probability both of the unit and of the system. The reserving
worsens the system’s safety in comparison to that of the unit but its influence
is extremely low and practically it can be considered that the system preserves
the same safety as the unit with reliability improved by orders of magnitude.
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